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GYPSIES, TRAMPS & THIEVES1:   
WHAT EUROPE’S ROMANIES CAN TEACH THE 
UNITED STATES ABOUT CRIME-MOTIVATED 
IMMIGRATION REFORM 
 
Allie Karoline Sievers *  
 
This comment proposes that the United States could learn a great deal about the 
dangers of extreme immigration policy-making by looking to the European states 
and their dealings with the Romani, specifically the French expulsions of the 
Romani in 2010.  Through this lens, this comment analyzes flaws in the U.S.’ 
crime-motivated immigration enforcement programs, and argues that the U.S. 
needs to move quickly to remedy flaws in immigration enforcement before it repeats 
many of the mistakes that led to the current condition of Europe’s Romanies and 
creates its own class of un-integrated ethnic minorities.  
 
INTRODUCTION:  THE CRIMES THAT SPARK THE DEBATE 
 On July 16, 2010, police in the small town of Saint-Aignan, France shot and 
killed Luigi Duquenet.2  According to media reports, Mr. Duquenet failed to stop his 
car at a checkpoint, continued to drive with an officer on the hood of his car, and 
was killed after driving his car at officers policing a second checkpoint – one of 
whom opened fire.3  Mr. Duquenet was twenty-two years old and a member of 
France’s “Gens du voyage” population,4 made up of Romani5 and other travelling 
                                                        
1  CHER, GYPSIES, TRAMPS & THIEVES (Kapp Records 1971).  
*  Allie Karoline Sievers, J.D. candidate, Penn State University Dickinson School of Law, 
2012.  I would like to thank Ann & Bob Sievers and Matthew Dempsey for their unending love, 
support, and encouragement.  I would also like to thank the entire JLIA staff for their editing 
assistance throughout the writing process. 
2  See Bruce Crumley, Anger as Sarkozy Targets Roma in Crime Crackdown, TIME, July 23, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2005818,00.html. 
3  See Ruadhán Mac Cormaic, Rioting over Traveller Killed by Police Sparks Debate on Security, IRISH 
TIMES, July 21, 2010, at 10. 
4  See Crumley, supra note 2; see also Council of Europe, Roma and Travellers Glossary 5 (Dec. 11, 
2006), www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/Source/documents/GlossaryRoma.doc [hereinafter Roma 
and Travellers Glossary] (defining “Gens du voyage” as a French administrative term applicable to Roma 
and non-Roma groups with nomadic lifestyles). 
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peoples.  In the days following Mr. Duquenet’s death, approximately fifty youths 
from his encampment rioted in and around Saint-Aignan, attacking the local police 
station with hatchets and iron bars, burning cars, and causing damage to local 
businesses and public property.6  These events are believed to have played a major 
role in prompting French President Nicolas Sarkozy to make several controversial 
policy decisions regarding the Romanies,7 including efforts to expel illegal Romani 
from France8 and break-up Romani encampments.9  
 
 Meanwhile, in the U.S., a number of high-profile crimes have been linked to 
similar fear-driven proposals for immigration reform.  Most notably, on March 27, 
2010, rancher Robert Krentz was found shot to death on his Arizona ranch shortly 
after radioing to his brother that he was stopping to assist somebody he believed to 
be an illegal immigrant.10  Officials and commentators have often cited his death as 
the impetus for Arizona’s controversial immigration law, SB 1070.11 
 
 Robert Krentz’s murder, of course, is just one in an increasingly long line of 
crimes in the U.S. that have been attributed to immigrant populations and used to 
fuel the fire of the immigration debate.  In September 2008, an illegal Guatemalan 
immigrant who had been arrested in the U.S. at least twelve times drove his S.U.V. 
through a busy intersection in Colorado and smashed into a pick-up truck.12  The 
pick-up truck was propelled forward, and ultimately crashed into an ice cream parlor, 
killing three people, including a three-year-old child.13  And more recently, in August 
2010, an elderly nun was killed in Virginia when a drunken driver crashed into her 
                                                                                                                                                       
5  In this comment, the term “Romani” (plural “Romanies”) will be used in any discussion of 
Gypsy, Roma, or appropriate Traveller populations.  While the term “Gypsy” continues to be used in 
common parlance, it is viewed as pejorative by many European Romani populations and will not be 
used in this comment unless it appears in a quote or statistic.  I have chosen to use Romani in lieu of 
“Roma,” as this term is embraced by all Romani groups, has been adopted by the Library of Congress 
as the official Subject Heading for materials on the Romani people, and has been given preference by 
preeminent scholars of Romani culture, including Ian Hancock.  See Roma and Travellers Glossary, supra 
note 4, at 7; see also Interview by Rory Litwin with Barbara Tillett, Chief of the Library of Congress 
Cataloging Policy and Support Office (Aug. 9, 2006), available at 
http://libraryjuicepress.com/blog/?p=115; IAN HANCOCK, WE ARE THE ROMANI PEOPLE xxvii – xx 
(2002). 
6  See Crumley, supra note 2. 
7  See id. 
8  In late July 2010, Mr. Sarkozy ordered the expulsion of Romanies who had committed 
“public-order offenses.”  As of September 2, 2010, it was estimated that France had removed 8,313 
Romanies in 2010.  See Matthew Saltmarsh, World Briefing Europe; France:  Plan on Gypsy Camps Opposed, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2010, at A7; see also Stephen Castle, European Union Report Questions France’s 
Expulsions of Roma, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2010, at A11. 
9  In addition to announcing plans to expel illegal Romani from France, Mr. Sarkozy also 
announced plans to take down illegal Romani camps.  France’s Interior Minister indicated that he 
planned to take down about 300 illegal camps, 200 of which were Romani.  See Saltmarsh, supra note 8. 
10  See Randal C. Archibold, Ranchers Alarmed by Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2010, at A9. 
11  See Dan Stein, Op-Ed., Arizona’s Simple, Legal Goal:  The State Is Just Doing What the Federal 
Government Isn’t -- Enforcing Our Laws, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2010, at 19.   
12  See Dan Frosch, In Colorado, Debate Over Program to Check Immigration History of the Arrested, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2010, at A16. 
13  See id. 
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car.14  The driver was an immigrant who was work-authorized at the time of the 
accident but had been residing in the U.S. illegally since 1996 and was in deportation 
proceedings for two prior D.U.I. convictions.15 
 
 While France and the U.S. have frequently diverged over international affairs, 
perhaps most notably during the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001,16 there 
are unavoidable similarities between the ways in which each government has 
responded to perceived increases in crime attributed to immigrant populations at 
home.  For instance, there are indications that the French population is supportive of 
Mr. Sarkozy’s recent moves against the Romani population,17 and recent polls in the 
U.S. suggest that Americans are in favor of legislation such as Arizona’s SB 1070.18  
It is undeniable that immigration has sparked an intense debate in each country.   
 
 This comment proposes that the U.S. could stand to learn a great deal about 
its immigration problems by looking at the mistakes that have been made with the 
Romani population in Europe for centuries, highlighted by the actions taken in 
France in 2010.  Specifically, the U.S. should look at accusations that France has 
violated core principles of the European Union (EU) by moving against the Romani 
and should strive to avoid promoting immigration policy that threatens to create a 
permanent sub-class of U.S. citizens and residents.  
 
 After providing a sample of the high-profile violence that has ignited the 
immigration debate in France and the U.S. in the Introduction,19 Part I continues 
with a brief history of the Romani in Europe intended to give flesh to Mr. Sarkozy’s 
recent efforts to expel Romani populations from France.20  Part I will also provide a 
brief overview of the EU’s Free Movement Directive and its application to recent 
events in France.21 
 
 Part II provides a short overview of several leading U.S. immigration law 
cases, as well as the recent shift in the focus of immigration enforcement towards 
crime and national security. 22   Part II also provides a snapshot of current 
immigration enforcement operations, focusing on three major programs: the 287(g) 
program, the Criminal Alien Program, and Secure Communities.23 
 
                                                        
14  See Robert McCartney, A World of Both Grace, Disgrace is Revealed in Nun’s Death, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 7, 2010. 
15  See Police Chief Says Illegal Immigrant Accused in Driving Death had Work Permit, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 4 2010. 
16  See Elaine Sciolino, Aftereffects:  Paris; France Works to Limit Damage from U.S. Anger, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at A13. 
17  See Ruadhán Mac Cormaic, Sarkozy Requests Law Revoking Citizenship, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2010, at 10. 
18  See Denis Bunis, Polls Show U.S. Torn Over Arizona Law, THE ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 
11, 2010; see also Randy Krehbiel, Strict Immigration Bills Still Enjoy Solid Support, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 31, 
2011, at A1. 
19  See supra Introduction. 
20  See infra Part I.A.  
21  See infra Part I.B.  
22  See infra Part II.A. 
23  See infra Part II.B. 
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 Part III focuses on the criticisms that have been articulated against both 
French and U.S. immigration policy, and strives to highlight how the U.S. could 
improve its own immigration outlook by looking to the mistakes made in Europe 
with the Romani populations.24  Specifically, Part III suggests that the U.S. needs to 
move quickly to remedy apparent flaws in immigration enforcement before it repeats 
many of the mistakes that led to the current condition of Europe’s Romanies and 
creates its own class of un-integrated minorities. 25   Part III concludes by 
recommending that the departments and agencies responsible for immigration move 
to streamline current enforcement programs, clarify enforcement goals, and make 
serious efforts to edify the U.S. public regarding immigration crime rates and other 
statistics.26 
 
I.  PERSECUTION & FREE MOVEMENT IN EUROPE 
 
A.  A Brief History of the Romani Population in Europe & the Development of Modern Anti-
Romani Sentiment 
 
 In order to fully understand why France’s recent “expulsions” of the Romani 
population have generated so much negative commentary, it is necessary to 
understand the history of Romani persecution in Europe and the Romani culture 
that has developed as a result.  The Romani people originally haled from the Indian 
subcontinent, beginning their migration to Europe and North Africa late in the first 
millennium C.E.,27 and their presence in Europe quickly became turbulent.  In 1471, 
the first anti-Romani law was recorded in Lucerne, Switzerland, and since 1504, 
France has periodically enacted laws under which Romani were barred from residing 
in French territory.28  In 1830, Germany began implementation of a policy by which 
Romani children were removed from their homes and placed with non-Romani 
families 29  in an effort to rid children of deviant Romani traits. 30   In 1934, the 
condition of the Romani further disintegrated when Sweden began sterilizing their 
Romani population, and the circumstance of the Romani reached its ultimate low 
during World War II, when the Romani were singled out by Hitler for eradication 
                                                        
24  See infra Part III.A-C. 
25  See infra Part III.C. 
26  See infra Part III.D. 
27  See DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EMP’T AND SOC. AFFAIRS, EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE 
SITUATION OF ROMA IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 7 (2004), available at 
http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/the-situation-of-roma-in-an-enlarged-european-union-
pbKE6204389/ [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT]. 
28   See The Patrin Web Journal, Timeline of Romani (Gypsy) History, 
http://www.reocities.com/Paris/5121/timeline.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).  In addition to the 
1504 law prohibiting Roma residences in France, similar laws were passed by various French 
monarchs and leaders in 1510, 1539, 1561, 1660, 1724, 1764 and 1803.  Apart from the various 
residence prohibitions, France has a long history of other anti-Roma laws.  For example, in 1601, 
Henry IV prohibited Roma gatherings of more than three or four persons.  In 1647, 1666 and 1682, 
Louis XIV instituted policies by which Roma were sent to the galleys as a result of their status as 
“bohemians,” and beginning in 1719, Roma were deported to the French colonies for the same 
reason. 
29  See id. 
30  See EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 27. 
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along with Europe’s Jewish population.31  The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum 
estimates that 200,000 Romani were killed in German concentration camps. 32  
Furthermore, it is believed that in some areas, including the modern Czech Republic, 
the Romani population was almost entirely wiped out during this “Romani 
Holocaust.”33  In the years following the war, efforts were made throughout Europe 
to stifle the nomadic and anti-social lifestyle of the Romani. 34   Across Europe, 
coercive sterilization policies and the systematic removal of children from Romani 
families became common.35  
 
 Today, Europe’s Romani population faces widespread anti-Romani 
sentiment. 36   Recent polls conducted in the Czech Republic and Germany are 
indicative of this trend, finding that seventy-nine percent of Czechs would not want 
a Romani neighbor, and sixty-four percent of Germans had an unfavorable opinion 
of the Romani people as a whole.37   
 
 The Romani response to this unyielding persecution has largely been to 
withdraw from mainstream European society.  While the various Romani 
populations do not share a common language, religion, or defined cultural identity,38 
nearly all Romani groups share a common “gypsy law,”39 which has developed in an 
effort to further insulate the Romani from the general population of each host 
country.40 
 
 Certain aspects of the gypsy law have exacerbated the anti-Romani sentiment 
prevalent in Europe today.  For example, under the Romani legal tradition, theft and 
fraud crimes are considered to be true crimes only when perpetrated against other 
Romani.41  Theft crimes committed against non-Romani are often praised, while 
theft crimes committed against other Romani frequently lead to public shaming and 
banishment.42  Furthermore, Romanies tend to insist that their law is superior to the 
law of the host nation, making it easier for them to justify violations of the host 
nation’s theft and fraud laws.43  European governments have often cited problems 
with theft, begging, and other violence in support of actions taken against Romani 
communities.44   
                                                        
31  See id. 
32  See Saltmarsh, supra note 8. 
33  See EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 27, at 8. 
34  See id. 
35  See id. 
36  See id. at 9. 
37  See id. at 9-10. 
38  See Iskra Uzunova, Roma Integration in Europe: Why Minority Rights are Failing, 27 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 283, 290 (2010). 
39   See generally Symposium, Gypsy Law Symposium, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 225 (1997), for 
additional information regarding the history and substance of gypsy law. 
40  See Uzunova, supra note 38, at 294.  
41  See id. at 295.  
42  See id.  
43  See id.  
44  See Elisabetta Povoledo, Italian Cities Plan to Shut Roma Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010, 
at A4; see also Suzanne Daley & Raphael Minder, In Spain, Gypsies Find Easier Path Toward Integration, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2010, at A5. 
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 The recent events in France are no exception.  In the days and weeks 
following Mr. Sarkozy’s announcement that his government would begin targeted 
removals of the French Romani population, various officials attempted to justify the 
move by stating that Romani camps in France were “sources of illegal trafficking, 
profoundly shocking living standards, the exploitation of children for begging, 
prostitution, and crime.”45  Mr. Sarkozy himself indicated that his decision to focus 
on the Romani was part of an “implacable struggle the government is leading against 
crime,”46 and France’s Interior Minister pointed to crime statistics suggesting that 
there had been a 138% increase in the number of Romani arrested in Paris in the 
preceding year.47   
 
 In addition to the legal and criminal issues that seem to drive most of the 
anti-Romani sentiment in Europe today, there are indications that other factors, 
including financial considerations, also figure into modern negative perceptions of 
the Romani.48  For example, a recent study conducted by the World Bank concluded 
that the failure of the Romani to integrate in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and the 
Czech Republic cost the host countries an estimated $7.3 billion per year.49  As a 
result, while institutions including the EU,50 the Catholic Church,51 and the European 
Roma Rights Centre52 have spoken out against the actions taken by Mr. Sarkozy, the 
French people have been notably absent from the international debate.  This relative 
quiet suggests that the French may not be as opposed to Mr. Sarkozy’s proposals as 
the rest of the world might expect them to be.  Indeed, a survey conducted by the 
French newspaper Le Figaro shortly after Mr. Sarkozy announced his plans for the 
Romani in late July found that nearly seventy-five percent of French voters 
supported his tough stance against the Romani.53  A separate poll by the newspaper 
Le Parisien found that forty-eight percent of the French supported the removals.54 
 
B.  An Introduction to the Free Movement Directive 
 While many of the criticisms of Mr. Sarkozy’s recent decision to break up 
Romani encampments and expel illegal Romani from France have centered on issues 
                                                        
45  Gavin Hewitt, The Roma Repatriation, Gavin Hewitt’s Europe, BBC NEWS, Aug. 19, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/gavinhewitt/gavin_hewitt/. 
46  Crumley, supra note 2. 
47  See Doreen Carvajal, France Vows to Continue Deporting Roma, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/world/europe/26iht-
roma.html?scp=2&sq=doreen+carvajal&st=nyt; see also EU to test Roma removals, THE AUSTRALIAN, 
Aug. 27, 2010, at 9. 
48  See Europe’s Roma:  Hard Travelling, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 2010, at 29. 
49  See id. 
50  See Katrin Bennhold & Stephen Castle, France May Face Legal Action Over Expulsions of 
Roma, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2010, at A6. 
51  See Steven Erlanger, France:  Sarkozy and Pope Meet Over French Actions Against Roma, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010, at A6; see also Carvajal, supra note 47; EU to test Roma Removals, supra note 47. 
52  See European Roma Rights Ctr., Submission in Relation to the Analysis and Consideration of 
Legality Under EU Law of the Situation of Roma in France:  Factual Update (2010), available at 
http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=3715 [hereinafter European Roma Rights Centre Submission]. 
53  See Mac Cormaic, supra note 17. 
54  See EU to Test Roma Removals, supra note 47. 
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of racism and past persecutions, the European Commission has questioned the 
legality of France’s decisions on another basis – claiming that France’s policies 
violate the EU’s Free Movement Directive (the Directive).55  The Directive, which 
was drafted in 2004 and entered into force in April 2006,56 reflects the fundamental 
EU principle that “[c]itizenship in the Union confers on every citizen of the Union a 
primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States” subject to certain limitations set forth in the Directive and the 
governing treaties of the EU,57 including the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.58  
 
 The Free Movement Directive is an expansive document, addressing 
everything from family membership to registration and documentation requirements 
in seven chapters and forty-two articles; several of these articles are directly on point 
with respect to the French expulsion of the Romani.59  Initially, it is important to 
note that the Directive affords to EU citizens the right of residence in another 
Member State for a period of three months with no conditions or formalities aside 
from possession of a valid identity card or passport.60  This right is afforded to all 
Union citizens so long as they do not impose an “unreasonable burden” on the host 
Member State’s social assistance systems.61  Union citizens who are self-employed, 
who obtain employment in the host Member State, or who have sufficient resources 
(including insurance) to support themselves and any accompanying family members 
are not subject to the three-month limitation.62  The right to residence afforded to 
Union citizens in another Member State covers the entire territory of the host state, 
and may be restricted only if the same restrictions apply to nationals of the host 
state.63 
 
 With respect to expulsion from the host state, the Directive is extremely 
strict, mandating that no Union citizen or family member may be automatically 
expelled due to reliance on social assistance programs. 64   The Directive does, 
however, allow restrictions to be imposed on rights to free movement and residence 
on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health.65  Nevertheless, any 
action taken by a host state on these grounds must be proportional and must be 
                                                        
55  See Stephen Castle, Europe Advances Case Against France Over Expulsions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
30, 2010, at A14; see also Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Eur. Comm’n Assesses Recent Developments 
in France, Discusses Overall Situation of the Roma and EU Law on Free Movement of EU Citizens 
(Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter European Commission Press Release]. 
56  See Eur. Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, The Situation of Roma EU Citizens Moving to 
and Settling in Other EU Member States, at 11 (2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=813&langId=en&moreDocuments=yes. 
57  Council Directive 2004/38/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 158). 
58  See Eur. Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, supra note 56, at 18; see also Treaty on 
European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html#0068000003. 
59  See Council Directive 2004/38/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 158). 
60  See id. at art. 6(1). 
61  Id. at art. 14(1). 
62  See id. at art. 7(1). 
63  See id. at art. 22. 
64  See Council Directive 2004/38/EC, art. 14(3), 2004 O.J. (L 158). 
65  See id. at art. 27(1). 
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based solely on the personal conduct of the individual who will be restricted.66  The 
conduct of the individual to be restricted must represent a “genuine, present and 
sufficiently serious threat” affecting a fundamental interest of the host state. 67  
General preventative measures are not permitted.68  When considering expulsion, the 
host Member State must also consider how long the individual has resided in the 
host state, his or her age and health, economic status, as well as the degree to which 
he or she has socially and culturally integrated into the host state.69 
 
 Once the host Member State has decided to initiate the expulsion of a Union 
citizen, the individual concerned must be notified of this decision in writing, and in 
most cases, the writing must specify the grounds on which the expulsion decision 
was made.70  The notification must also advise the individual being expelled of the 
court or administrative agency responsible for appeals, and the individual must be 
given at least one month to depart the host state.71 
 
 Lastly, the Directive requires that all Member States transpose the elements 
of the Directive into their own laws, regulations, and administrative processes.72 
 
II.  UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION LAW – CUSTOM & ENFORCEMENT 
A.  Plenary Power & the Origins of Crime-Based Deportation Programs in a Post 9-11 United 
States 
 
 In 1889, the U.S. Supreme Court decided one of the first major U.S. 
immigration law cases, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, also known as the Chinese 
Exclusion Case.73  In this seminal case, the Court recognized that Congress and the 
Executive Branch have inherent authority to regulate immigration issues pertaining 
to the exclusion of noncitizens seeking admission to the U.S.74  As the basis for this 
holding, the Court declared that the power to exclude noncitizens was an “incident 
of sovereignty” 75  and that the power of the legislature to exclude aliens was a 
proposition not “open to controversy.” 76   In 1893, the Court extended the 
application of this inherent authority to the expulsion, or deportation, of noncitizens 
in Fong Yue Ting v. United States.77  Specifically, the Court stated that “[t]he right of a 
nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any 
                                                        
66  See id. at art. 27(2). 
67  Id. 
68  See id. 
69  See Council Directive 2004/38/EC, art. 28(1), 2004 O.J. (L 158). 
70  See id. at art. 30(1, 2). 
71  See id. at art. 30(3). 
72  See id. at art. 40(1). 
73  See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
74  See JON FERRE, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, PLENARY POWER:  SHOULD JUDGES 
CONTROL U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY? 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2009/back209.pdf (discussing the roots of the plenary power doctrine in 
U.S. immigration law). 
75  Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609. 
76  Id. at 603.  
77  See generally Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
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steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is 
as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into 
the country.”78   
 
 Taken together, these cases support the premise that a sovereign state 
generally has wide latitude to establish the criteria by which outsiders can be 
admitted to and expelled from its territory.  Over the decades, the U.S. has 
established many such criteria, barring individuals from admission if they suffered 
from HIV/AIDS, 79 practiced polygamy, advocated the forcible overthrow of the 
government, failed a literacy test, or engaged in prostitution.80 
 
 In recent decades, there has been increased emphasis on the application of 
criminal and national security criteria to immigration enforcement.  One of the 
earliest examples of this application occurred in 1979, following the Iranian Hostage 
Crisis.81  On November 13, 1979, President Carter directed the promulgation of 
Regulation 214.5, requiring all Iranian post-secondary students in the U.S. to report 
to a local INS office so that their nonimmigrant status could be verified.82  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld this regulation in Narenji v. Civiletti, 
with Circuit Judge MacKinnon stating that the regulation at issue lay within the realm 
of foreign affairs and therefore “implicat[ed] matters over which the President has 
direct constitutional authority.”83  The court also cited to the Supreme Court holding 
in Matthews v. Diaz, stating that “any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the 
flexibility of the political branches of the government to respond to changing world 
conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution.”84 
 
 Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been an even 
more marked shift toward the enforcement of immigration laws on criminal and 
national security grounds.  On October 26, 2001, in the immediate aftermath of the 
attacks, President Bush signed into law the USA Patriot Act,85 which was designed, 
in part, to increase the authority of U.S. law enforcement agencies to investigate 
terrorism and to facilitate the sharing of information between the various law 
enforcement agencies.86  Shortly thereafter, in September 2002, the Department of 
Justice initiated the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS),87 
                                                        
78  Id. at 707. 
79  See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE 
LAW AND POLICY 462 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009).   
80  See id. at 422-425. 
81  See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
82  See id. 
83  Id. at 748. 
84  Id. (citing Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)). 
85  See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
86  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2010). 
87  On April 28, 2011, DHS announced that the NSEERS program would be suspended, 
effective immediately.  See Removing Designated Countries From the National Security Entry-Exit 
Registration System (NSEERS), 76 FED. REG. 82, 23,830 (Apr. 28, 2011); see also Miriam Jordan, 
Controversial Surveillance Program Launched After 9/11 Ends, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2011, 
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requiring nonimmigrant aliens from countries presenting “elevated national security 
concerns” to be fingerprinted and photographed upon entry to the U.S. as well as to 
provide detailed background information to officers of the INS.88  These targeted 
registration requirements were upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit in Kandamar v. Gonzales because they served the “legitimate government 
objectives of monitoring nationals from certain countries to prevent terrorism.”89 
 
 These cases and policies are illustrative of the broad brush that has been 
utilized by Congress and the Executive when formulating immigration policies.  
Understanding these trends is essential to appreciating the basis of the criminal 
immigration programs that have come into effect in recent decades, primarily under 
the umbrella of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Agreements of 
Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security (ACCESS), including 
the 287(g), Criminal Alien, and Secure Communities programs.90    
 
B.  Immigration Enforcement under ICE ACCESS 
 
1. Immigration Cross-Designation 287(g) 
 
 Roughly fifteen years ago, Congress enacted amendments to the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA) via the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).91  Included in these amendments was a new 
section, 287(g),92 permitting the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (formerly 
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)) to enter into agreements 
with state and local law enforcement agencies whereby those agencies can perform 
immigration officer functions after training and under the supervision of ICE. 93  
Initially developed by Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa, the 287(g) program was 
meant to address frustration among his constituents that local law enforcement was 
powerless against immigration problems, having to report violators to overburdened 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704187604576289682985267902.html?mod=googl
enews_wsj. 
88  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Second Phase of National Security Entry-Exit 
Registration System Announced (Nov. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2002/November/02_ag_649.htm. 
89  Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2006). 
90   The ICE ACCESS initiative currently consists of fourteen programs:  Asset 
Forfeiture/Equitable Sharing, Border Enhancement Security Task Force (BEST), Criminal Alien 
Program (CAP), Customs Cross-Designation (Title 19), Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces, 
Fugitive Operations, Immigration Cross-Designation – 287(g), Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
Center, Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC), Operation Community Shield, Operation Firewall, 
Operation Predator, Rapid REPAT, and Secure Communities.  See U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, ICE ACCESS, http://www.ice.gov/access/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2012) [hereinafter 
ICE ACESS Overview]. 
91  See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet:  Delegation of Immigration 
Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, 
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2012) [hereinafter 287(g) 
Fact Sheet]. 
92  See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). 
93  See 287(g) Fact Sheet, supra note 91.  See also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). 
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ICE officials instead of taking direct action. 94   The program operates through 
memoranda of agreement (MOA) entered into by DHS, ICE, and the local law 
enforcement agency (LEA), the first of which was entered into by the Bush 
Administration in 2002.95  A majority of the agreements currently in existence are 
detention model programs, which permit correctional officers to screen any 
individuals arrested or convicted against federal databases to check their immigration 
status.96 
 
 In response to widespread criticism of the 287(g) program, including a report 
published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in January 2009,97 
the Obama Administration immediately re-assessed the program upon taking 
office.98  In July 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced sweeping changes 
to the program,99 including the introduction of a new Model MOA,100 which aligned 
the priorities of the 287(g) program with those of ICE generally.101  As such, the new 
Model MOA prioritizes the removal of aliens who have been arrested or convicted in 
connection with “major drug offenses” or violent crimes such as murder, rape, or 
manslaughter.102  Aliens convicted of minor drug offenses, property crimes, or other 
offenses are to be given lesser priority.103 
 
 From a statistical standpoint, the 287(g) program has proven to be an 
effective tool for ICE as the department focuses on the removal of criminal aliens 
from the U.S.; from January 2006 to December 2009, immigration charges were 
                                                        
94  See Mimi E. Tsankov & Christina J. Martin, Measured Enforcement:  A Policy Shift in the ICE 
287(g) Program, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 403, 413-14 (2010). 
95  See JESSICA VAUGHN & JAMES R. EDWARDS, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE 
287(G) PROGRAM:  PROTECTING HOME TOWNS AND HOMELAND 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.cis.org/287greport [hereinafter CIS 287(G) BACKGROUNDER]. 
96  See Tsankov, supra note 94, at 417. 
97  The Government Accountability Office criticized the execution of the 287(g) program on 
several fronts:  (1) federal objectives to prioritize the most dangerous criminals were not clearly 
communicated to participating LEAs; (2) it was unclear from federal materials how participating 
LEAs could use their authority under the program; (3) the nature and extent of ICE’s supervision of 
the program was imprecise; and (4) data requirements imposed on the LEAs were unspecific.  See U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:  BETTER 
CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS (2009) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
98  See Tsankov, supra note 94, at 422. 
99  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano Announces 
New Agreement for State and Local Immigration Enforcement Partnerships & Adds 11 New 
Agreements (July 10, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1247246453625.shtm. 
100  See Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Model MOA (Memorandum of Agreement), available at 
http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/287g-MOA-2009-07-14.doc [hereinafter Model 
MOA]. 
101  See Tsankov, supra note 94, at 422-23; see also Memorandum from John Morton, Civil 
Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 
30, 2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
reform/pdf/civil_enforcement_priorities.pdf (articulating three clear immigration enforcement 
priority groups: aliens posing a danger to national security or public safety, recent illegal entrants, and 
aliens who are fugitives or who obstruct immigration control). 
102  See Model MOA, supra note 100, at 17. 
103  See id. 
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lodged against 81,000 criminal or undocumented aliens by 287(g) officers. 104  
Furthermore, the program has been touted as a “force multiplier,” allowing ICE to 
supplement its regional forces to accomplish more arrests and removals.105 
 
 2. Criminal Alien Program 
 
 Another noteworthy program falling under the umbrella of ICE ACCESS is 
the Criminal Alien Program (CAP),106 which seeks to prevent criminal aliens from 
being released into the general population by securing a final order of removal prior 
to their release from federal, state, or local prison.107  Like the other programs falling 
within ICE ACCESS, CAP is meant to be utilized to target and remove the most 
serious criminal aliens.108  Generally speaking, the program has proven to be very 
efficient, with ICE reporting that in fiscal year 2008, 221,085 charging documents 
were issued to initiate the removal of criminal aliens in the U.S. prison system.109  
This represents a forty-six percent increase over the 2007 fiscal year, during which 
164,296 charging documents were issued under CAP.110  The program is currently 
active in all 114 U.S. federal prisons, and as of March 2008,111 the program was active 
in approximately ten percent of the nation’s local jails.112 
 
 Like the 287(g) program, CAP relies on cooperation with local law 
enforcement to accomplish its goals.  Specifically, local officers are asked to notify 
the ICE Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) whenever they 
identify foreign-born detainees during their facility’s booking process. 113   DRO 
officers then interview inmates flagged by local officers to determine whether they 
wish to initiate an immigration hold against the individual. 114   Traditionally, 
                                                        
104  See CIS 287(G) BACKGROUNDER, supra note 95, at 1. 
105  See id. at 2.  In 2008, the ICE investigations office based in Denver made 1,594 arrests in 
Colorado and several other states covered by that team.  In the same period, the 287(g) force in 
Colorado made 777 in-state arrests. 
106  CAP as it exists today was created in 2007 through the merger of two older programs: 
the Institutional Removal Program and the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program.  See MELISSA 
KEANEY & JOAN FRIEDLAND, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., OVERVIEW OF THE KEY ICE 
ACCESS PROGRAMS, 287(G), THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM, AND SECURE COMMUNITIES 4 (2009), 
available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/ice-access-2009-11-05.pdf [hereinafter 
NILC ICE ACCESS OVERVIEW]. 
107   See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Criminal Alien Program, 
http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
108  See TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. 
ON RACE, ETHNICITY, AND DIVERSITY, THE C.A.P EFFECT:  RACIAL PROFILING IN THE ICE 
CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter WARREN INST. 
REPORT]. 
109   See 2008 ICE ANN. REP. at 3, available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_08.pdf [hereinafter 
2008 ICE ANNUAL REPORT]. 
110  See id. 
111  See id. 
112  See NILC ICE ACCESS OVERVIEW, supra note 106, at 4.  
113  See id. 
114  See id. 
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interviews were conducted in person.115  However, since 2006 the interviews have 
increasingly been conducted telephonically.116  The switch to remote interviewing has 
been accompanied by the creation of a real-time computer system providing LEAs 
with 24-7 access to ICE.117  If an immigration hold is in place, the local facility is 
required to notify ICE prior to releasing the individual from custody and may hold 
the individual for an additional period, not to exceed forty-eight hours, so that they 
may be transferred to ICE custody.118 
 
3. Secure Communities 
 
 A third major program falling under the umbrella of ICE ACCESS is the 
Secure Communities program, which was introduced by DHS in 2008.119  Secure 
Communities, intended to expand CAP, is specifically targeted towards state and 
local prison systems 120  and, like the other ICE ACCESS programs, relies upon 
cooperation and coordination with LEAs.121  The program functions by transmitting 
digital fingerprints, taken from aliens upon arrest or imprisonment, to ICE where 
they are matched against federal immigration databases.122  Upon creation of the 
program, Congress requested that it accomplish four goals:  (1) identify and process 
all criminal aliens subject to removal in state and local prison systems; (2) enhance 
ICE detention strategies to ensure that no removable criminal alien is released into 
the public due to lack of detention space; (3) reduce the time a removable criminal 
alien remains in detention prior to removal; and (4) maximize cost effectiveness.123  
Like the 287(g) program and CAP, the Secure Communities program is intended to 
target the most dangerous criminal aliens for removal, 124  with a focus on aliens 
convicted of major drug offenses and violent crimes such as rape and murder.125 
 
 Secure Communities is similar to its predecessors in that it has been, 
numerically speaking, successful in accomplishing federal deportation goals.  In a 
letter to the New York Times in December 2009, John Morton, then Assistant 
Secretary for ICE, reported that Secure Communities identified 11,000 aliens 
convicted of serious crimes such as rape and murder in its first year alone, 1,900 of 
whom had been removed.126  In March 2010, the Los Angeles Times reported that 
Secure Communities had identified 18,000 aliens convicted of serious crimes and 
                                                        
115  See id. 
116  See id. 
117  See NILC ICE ACCESS OVERVIEW, supra note 106, at 4; see also WARREN INST. REPORT, 
supra note 108, at 1. 
118  See NILC ICE ACCESS OVERVIEW, supra note 106, at 4.  
119  See 2008 ICE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 109, at iii. 
120  See id. at 5. 
121  See ICE ACESS Overview, supra note 90. 
122  See Thomas Frank, New Effort Helps Finger, Net Potential Deportees:  Program Uses Inmates’ 
Prints to Discover Illegal Status, USA TODAY, May 12, 2009, at 3A. 
123  See 2008 ICE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 109, at 5. 
124  See Hearing on Priorities Enforcing Immigration Law Before the H. Appropriations Subcomm. on 
Homeland Security, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of David Venturella, Executive Director, Secure 
Communities, Immigration and Customs Enforcement). 
125  See 2008 ICE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 109, at 5. 
126  See John Morton, Letter to the Editor, Immigration Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009. 
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that 4,000 had been removed.127   
 
III.  HOW IT ALL COMES TOGETHER 
A.  French Criticism 
 
 On September 29, 2010, the European Commission issued a warning to the 
French government in response to its efforts to expel members of the Romani 
community from France in the late summer and fall of 2010.128  In the accompanying 
press release, the Commission acknowledged that it had been assured by France that 
measures taken to remove Romani persons from France were not undertaken with 
the intent to discriminate against the Romani ethnic minority; however, the 
Commission also stated that France had not fully transposed the 2004 Free 
Movement Directive as required.129  The Commission gave France just over two 
weeks to respond to its warning with a detailed plan for full transposition of the 
Directive.130 
 
 In 2010, France’s flawed transposition of the Free Movement Directive 
existed, primarily, in two sources of law:  Law No. 2006-911 of July 24, 2006 and 
Ministerial Decree No. 2007-371 of March 21, 2007. 131   Collectively, these 
instruments addressed immigration, integration, and Union citizens’ rights of 
residence.132  Additional guidance with respect to transposition was also found in 
various circulaires, which addressed a variety of issues ranging from health care to 
admission and expulsion criteria.133  In June 2011, France added to its transposition 
of the Free Movement Directive by enacting Law No. 2011-672.134  Following the 
enactment of this new legislation, questions remained regarding the accuracy and 
completeness of France’s transposition of the Directive;135 however, these issues are 
                                                        
127  See Paloma Esquivel, O.C. Jail Inmates’ Status Checked:  The County Joins 11 Others in the State 
in Seeking to Deport Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at 4. 
128  See European Commission Press Release, supra note 55; see also Castle, supra note 55. 
129   See European Commission Press Release, supra note 55; see also Council Directive 
2004/38/EC, art. 40(1), 2004 O.J. (L 158) (requiring all Member States to implement laws, regulations, 
and administrative policies to incorporate the principles of Directive into their domestic law within 
two years). 
130  See European Commission Press Release, supra note 55. 
131  See MILIEU ENVTL. LAW & POLICY, CONFORMITY STUDY FOR FRANCE: DIRECTIVE 
2004/38/EC ON THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS OF THE UNION AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS TO MOVE 
AND RESIDE FREELY WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE MEMBER STATES 6 (2008) (Belg.), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/30160637/null [hereinafter CONFORMITY STUDY]. 
132  See id. 
133  See id. at 6-7. 
134  See Loi 2011-672 du 16 juin 2011 relative à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité 
[Law 2011-672 of June 16, 2011 on Immigration, Integration and Nationality], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE 
LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 17, 2011. 
135  See Eur. Parliament, Parliamentary Question:  Compliance of French Law No 2011-672 of 16 June 
2011 on Immigration, Integration and Nationality with EU legislation (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2011-
008463+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN; see also France’s Compliance with the European Free Movement Directive 
and the Removal of Ethnic Roma EU Citizens:  A Briefing Paper Submitted to the European Commission in July 
2011, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/28/france-s-
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beyond the scope of this comment, which focuses on the law as it existed in 2010. 
 
 Leading up to France’s Romani expulsions in 2010, several independent 
studies criticized the French transposition of the Directive.  In 2008, the University 
of Edinburgh and Milieu Ltd. conducted a conformity study that analyzed the 
correctness and sufficiency of France’s efforts to transpose the Directive into their 
domestic law.136  In pertinent part, the study concluded that France’s transposition of 
Article 27 of the Directive, speaking to the restriction of free movement based on 
the personal conduct of the individual concerned, was incomplete.137  Specifically, the 
study suggested that France’s failure to prohibit the use of expulsion to facilitate 
economic advantage, as well as its failure to specify that the conduct of the individual 
to be expelled must constitute the only grounds for expulsion, rendered the 
transposition inadequate. 138   Furthermore, the study found that France’s 
transposition of Article 28(1) of the Directive, speaking to protections against 
expulsion, was nonexistent, 139  and that the notice requirements and procedural 
safeguards of the Directive had not been fully transposed.140 
 
 In February 2009, the European Parliament released its own evaluation of 
the French transposition, concluding that it was ambiguous and, in some instances, 
contrary to the spirit of the Directive itself.141  Like the Edinburgh study above, the 
European Parliament study found that there were insufficient protections in place 
with respect to expulsion, stating that protections against expulsion prompted by 
reliance on social assistance were not guaranteed as required under the Directive.142   
 
 The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) released an additional study on 
this topic in September 2010. 143   This study alleged violations of the non-
discrimination clauses of the Directive, suggesting that France had a pattern of 
singling out the Romani ethnic minority for law enforcement actions.144  In addition, 
the study indicated that expulsion documents utilized in 2010 were produced en 
masse; making it unlikely that adequate consideration was afforded to individual 
circumstances as required under Article 28 of the Directive.145  Furthermore, the 
ERRC study suggested that France, in 2010, facilitated the expulsion of Romani 
persons who had resided in France for less than three months in violation of Article 
                                                                                                                                                       
compliance-european-free-movement-directive-and-removal-ethnic-roma-eu-
citi#_Legal_Provisions_in. 
136  See CONFORMITY STUDY, supra note 131. 
137  See id. at 10-11. 
138  See id. at 11. 
139  See id. at 10-11. 
140  See id. at 11. 
141   See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE GENERAL INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE 
UNION, APPLICATION OF DIRECTIVE 2004/38/EC OF 29 APRIL 2004 ON THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS OF 
THE UNION AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS TO MOVE AND RESIDE FREELY WITHIN THE TERRITORY 
OF THE MEMBER STATES iv (Feb. 2009) (Executive Summary), available at 
www.statewatch.org/news/2009/feb/ep-free-movement-report.pdf. 
142  See id. 
143  See European Roma Rights Centre Submission, supra note 52. 
144  See id. at 1. 
145  See id. at 2. 
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6 of the Directive.146 
 
 Collectively, the studies analyzing France’s failed compliance with the Free 
Movement Directive, the actions taken against the Romani in 2010, and the rapid 
response from the European Commission suggest that the position taken by the 
French, with respect to the right of free movement within the European Community, 
is at odds with the fundamental right of Europeans “to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States.”147  This most recent saga of Europe’s Romani, 
combined with their tumultuous history, could provide law and policy makers in the 
U.S. with an excellent, modern example of the risks associated with policy making in 
the realm of migration. 
 
B.  U.S. Policy Criticism 
 
 As the sections above illustrate, crime-motivated immigration policy in the 
U.S. today is largely comprised of the various programs administered under the 
umbrella of ICE ACCESS.  The ICE ACCESS programs operate under the common 
auspice of assisting local LEAs as they deal with immigration enforcement issues in 
their communities,148 and at first blush, the numbers suggest that the programs have 
been successful.  For example, in the 2010 fiscal year, DHS removed 387,000 foreign 
nationals from the U.S., including 169,000 known criminal aliens. 149   However, 
criticism of these programs has persisted, and there are legitimate questions as to 
their overall functionality. 
 
 The criticisms plaguing the 287(g) program are illustrative of the criticisms 
that have followed many of the ICE ACCESS programs in recent years.  As 
previously discussed,150 the 287(g) program was recently overhauled by the Obama 
Administration following criticisms by the GAO. 151   Nevertheless, some of the 
criticisms that beleaguered the program prior to the changes made under the Obama 
Administration persist today. 152   In March 2010, DHS promulgated a report 
                                                        
146  See id. at 3. 
147  Council Directive 2004/38/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 158). 
148   See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet:  ICE Agreements of 
Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security (ACCESS), 
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/access.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). 
149  U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-2010.pdf. 
150  See supra Part III.B.1. 
151  See GAO REPORT, supra note 97. 
152  On August 12, 2010, the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), a Hispanic civil rights 
and advocacy group based in Washington D.C. released a report on the status of the 287(g) program 
entitled “The Impact of Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on the Latino 
Community.”  In the report, the NCLR outlines various criticisms of the program, including:  (1) its 
application to noncitizens who commit minor crimes instead of the violent criminals who are the 
program’s intended target; (2) its tendency to divert police attention away from traditional law 
enforcement; (3) its propensity to undermine community-based strategies that rely on population 
groups, such as immigrant populations, to report crimes to authorities; and (4) its vulnerability to 
racial profiling and other civil rights violations.  See A. ELENA LACAYO, NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, 
THE IMPACT OF SECTION 287(G) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT ON THE LATINO 
COMMUNITY (Aug. 12, 2010), available at 
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recommending thirty-three changes to the 287(g) program,153 a majority of which 
pertained to the training and supervision of officers as well as the availability of 
program information to the public.154  However, other recommendations set forth in 
the report pertained to more serious civil rights and civil liberties concerns frequently 
raised by advocacy groups.155   
 
 Specifically, the DHS report highlights concerns that the civil rights and civil 
liberties track records of applicant LEAs are not formally evaluated during the 
application process and that several participating LEAs have been embroiled in 
claims of civil rights violations.156  Of particular concern is the fact that at the time of 
the report, one LEA participant was involved in at least three lawsuits implicating 
civil rights concerns; one pertaining to allegations of racial profiling in connection 
with 287(g) participation, another pertaining to allegations of physical abuse inflicted 
upon a detained noncitizen, and yet another pertaining to allegations of national 
origin discrimination.157  The report also addresses concerns raised by various NGOs 
that by permitting LEAs with suspect civil rights backgrounds to participate in the 
287(g) program, ICE is increasing the likelihood that noncitizens will be subjected to 
racial profiling.158 
 
 Criticism of the 287(g) program has also been reflected in the news media.  
In December 2010, the New York Times published an in-depth expose of the risks 
faced by illegal immigrants in the U.S. who drive without a valid license.159  The 
article centered on the case of Felipa Leonor Valencia, whose car was hit when a U.S. 
citizen driver failed to stop at a red light in Lawrenceville, Georgia.160  The accident, 
which triggered only a fine for the U.S. citizen driver, resulted in Ms. Valencia’s 
being placed in immigration detention, as Gwinnett County, where Lawrenceville is 
located, is a participant in the 287(g) program. 161   Ms. Valencia’s story is 
representative of the fear, surrounding the 287(g) program, that minor offenders will 
be caught up in enforcement as the program expands into more communities 
nationwide.  Meanwhile, in Lawrenceville, Hispanic leaders have suggested that 
287(g) enforcement in their community has resulted in decreased attendance at 
church services and decreased patronage at Latino restaurants because unlicensed 
drivers are fearful of any interactions with local police.162  Enforcement has also 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.nclr.org/index.php/site/pub_types/issue_briefs; see also Jeremy Redmon, Metro Agencies 
to Feds:  Let Us In, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Aug. 28, 2010, at A1. 
153   See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OIG-10-63, THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) 
AGREEMENTS 1 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_10-
63_Mar10.pdf [hereinafter PERFORMANCE OF 287((G)]. 
154  See id. at 22.  
155  See id. 
156  See id. at 22-23. 
157  See id. at 23. 
158  See PERFORMANCE OF 287(G), supra note 153, at 23.  
159  See Julia Preston & Robert Gebeloff, Unlicensed Drivers Who Risk More Than a Fine, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2010, at A1. 
160  See id. 
161  See id. 
162   See id.  Accord RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND 
DIVERGENCE:  A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 48 (2011) 
[hereinafter MIGRATION POLICY INST.]. 
2012 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 1:1 
 
 114 
prompted some illegal aliens to relocate to other, friendlier parts of Georgia. 163  
While the Gwinnett County Sheriff is pleased with these effects of the 287(g) 
program, 164  it seems that enforcement policies that force immigrant populations 
underground and discourage civic participation could have long term negative effects 
on communities.  The New York Times estimates that 4.5 million illegal immigrants 
drive regularly, 165  most without licenses as only two states currently allow 
undocumented immigrants to obtain a license.166  This is a huge group of people who 
could be targeted by the 287(g) program if enforcement is not limited to the most 
dangerous criminals it is meant to prioritize. 
 
 Persistent criticisms also plague the Criminal Alien Program.  In September 
2009, a policy brief published by the Warren Institute at Berkeley Law alleged that 
ICE is not abiding by congressional directives to focus removal proceedings on the 
most dangerous criminal aliens and that LEAs may be utilizing the program to 
facilitate racial profiling. 167   The study, based on data collected in Irving, Texas, 
suggests that the transition to telephonic interviews and 24-7 access to ICE led to a 
spike in the number of Hispanic arrests in Irving as well as a spike in the number of 
discretionary arrests based on low-level misdemeanor offenses, indicating that Irving 
police may have been using CAP to facilitate increased deportations of Hispanic 
immigrants. 168   Further, the study found that only two percent of immigration 
detainers issued by ICE in Irving under CAP were based on felony charges.169   
 
 Additional criticism of CAP has come from the Obama Administration itself, 
which issued a report on immigration detention in 2009.170  Data relied upon in the 
report showed that of the 178,605 people detained by ICE through CAP in 2009, 
fifty-seven percent had no criminal conviction.171  These numbers provide substance 
to arguments frequently made by immigrant rights groups that enforcement of 
criminal alien programs is too broad. 
 
 Finally, the Secure Communities program has also faced stiff criticism since 
its development in 2008.  As with the other programs falling under the umbrella of 
ICE ACCESS, critics have expressed frustration with the program’s failure to 
prioritize the most dangerous criminals. 172   Recently, the National Institute of 
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Corrections issued a report analyzing Secure Communities statistics through March 
22, 2009, finding that out of the 19,495 individuals identified through the program 
thus far, only 1,436 were classified as dangerous criminals. 173   Furthermore, 
immigrants’ rights groups have also expressed concerns that fears of racial profiling, 
augmented by a jurisdiction’s enrollment in Secure Communities, may undermine 
trust between immigrant communities and law enforcement, limiting the 
effectiveness of traditional law enforcement.174  Specifically, many people fear that 
implementation of the program will make immigrants less likely to report crimes or 
testify.175 
 
 Just as the Obama Administration has acknowledged concerns with the 
287(g) program and CAP, in recent months there has been a substantial effort made 
to reign in Secure Communities.  Specifically, on June 17, 2011, John Morton issued 
an agency-wide memorandum clarifying the role of “prosecutorial discretion” in 
immigration enforcement. 176   The memo, in part, discussed the scope of 
prosecutorial discretion in the immigration system, enumerated factors that may be 
taken into consideration when determining whether or not to exercise discretion, and 
clarified which ICE employees may exercise discretion in accordance with their 
specific responsibilities. 177   The memo also makes clear that discretion may be 
exercised at any stage of the deportation process.178  This memo has been interpreted 
by many in the immigration field as an effort to focus the program more closely on 
immigrants convicted of serious crimes and limit the extent to which individuals with 
minor convictions, or no conviction at all, are caught up in the system.179  And the 
memo has already had a seemingly positive impact on the program.  Building upon 
the parameters established by Morton, the Obama Administration announced in 
August 2011 that it would suspend deportation proceedings in cases where there was 
no national security or public safety threat, and that it would review cases one by one 
to determine whether or not to exercise prosecutorial discretion.180  Further, the 
portion of ICE’s website dedicated to the Secure Communities program now 
includes a “What’s New” section outlining the agency’s various initiatives developed 
in response to civil rights concerns, including:  Advisory Committee & Minor Traffic 
Offenses, Prosecutorial Discretion, Training for States, and Protecting Victims & 
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Witnesses of Crimes.181 
 
 However, these are not the only changes that have been made to the Secure 
Communities program.  In recent months, several states have expressed a desire to 
opt-out of Secure Communities due to concerns about its over-inclusive nature and 
the chilling effect it may have on traditional law enforcement.182  However, in August 
2011, the Obama Administration announced that the program would be mandatory 
for all states and that it is to be effective nation-wide by 2013.183  This push to move 
forward with the program, in spite of the concerns that have been raised by various 
groups, is disconcerting even in light of the advancements signaled by the increased 
application of prosecutorial discretion. 
 
C.  Challenges to Meaningful Immigration Reform in the United States & How Europe’s History 
with the Romani Can Guide the Path Forward 
 
 As the increasing prevalence of criminal immigration enforcement programs 
suggests, the national discourse on immigration is increasingly focused on violence, 
be it on the southern border or in our nation’s jails and prisons.  As the sections 
above suggest, the programs developed in recent years by DHS (and ICE) to identify 
and remove criminal aliens are flawed but necessary to protect our communities 
from some of the most dangerous threats to our daily life.  However, while the 
threats are real, we must remember that there are other aspects of the immigration 
system in the U.S. that are desperately in need of reform and avoid falling into the 
trap of turning a blind eye to the larger problems.  The saga of the European Romani, 
specifically recent events in France, can teach us a great deal about the pitfalls of 
trying to legislate migration and the risks associated with using preconceived notions 
of immigrant populations for political gain. 
 
 Ever since the first recorded anti-Romani law was enacted in 1471, the 
Romani have faced a steady stream of discrimination throughout Europe, a trend 
that continues today.184  In August of 2010, high-ranking officials within the Sarkozy 
administration justified their removals of hundreds of Romani from France by 
pointing to crime statistics,185 while seemingly violating key portions of the EU’s Free 
Movement Directive at every turn.  Many outside observers surmised that Mr. 
Sarkozy’s primary motivation for initiating the removals was political gain; he was 
seeking to bolster an approval rating that had been devastated by a series of political 
scandals in 2010. 186   But while Mr. Sarkozy’s motivations may never be fully 
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disclosed, one thing is clear:  France’s expulsion of the Romani in 2010 is simply the 
latest in a long line of abuses directed towards an un-integrated ethnic minority in 
Europe.187 
 
 Likewise, immigration reform has become a hot issue in American 
elections,188 and several regional lawmakers have been catapulted onto the national 
stage as a result of their divisive proposals.  In April 2010, Arizona’s Governor, Jan 
Brewer, became a central figure in the U.S. immigration debate after she signed SB 
1070 into law, a controversial law that proposed, in part, to make failure to carry 
immigration documents a crime and sought to give local law enforcement broad 
powers to detain anybody suspected of being in the U.S. illegally.189  Although several 
portions of the law were struck down in a July 2010 decision by the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Arizona,190 many other states are following Arizona’s lead.191  
Governor Brewer and her like-minded peers have frequently relied on criminal 
justifications when speaking in support of Arizona-style legislation,192 arguing that 
federal inaction with respect to immigration reform has forced state governments to 
take control of the matter.193  But what immigration pundits in regional governments 
and many news outlets often fail to report is that crime rates along the southern 
border have actually declined, with instances of violent crimes in Arizona falling to 
447 per 100,000 residents in 2008 from 532 per 100,000 residents in 2000.194  Further, 
President Obama recently sent an additional 1,200 National Guard troops to the 
southern border in an effort to further bolster security,195 and there is evidence that 
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illegal border crossings have slowed dramatically.196 
 
 Another obstacle to achieving meaningful immigration reform in the U.S. 
that closely mirrors problems with the Romani in Europe is the public perception of 
immigrant criminality.  Stories regarding criminal immigration issues regularly appear 
in the news media,197 feeding popular stereotypes that immigrant populations are 
plagued with higher levels of crime and imprisonment than the general population.  
However, a 2007 study by the Immigration Policy Center found that these 
stereotypes are largely unsupported by crime statistics.198  The Immigration Policy 
Center concluded that, for every ethnic group, incarceration rates for young men are 
lower for immigrants than for their American-born counterparts, including Mexican, 
Salvadoran, and Guatemalan immigrants who account for a majority of the 
undocumented population in the U.S.199  Strikingly, for the period studied, foreign-
born Mexican immigrants had an incarceration rate of just 0.7% compared with a 
rate of 5.9% for males of Mexican descent born in the U.S.200  The public perception 
of crime rates among immigrant populations must be brought into line with reality if 
we hope to defuse the arguments of those who would strip immigrant populations of 
constitutional rights in the name of public safety. 
 
D.  How Do We Avoid the Pitfalls? 
 
 It is becoming increasingly clear that the U.S. needs to recalibrate not only its 
immigration policy, but also its public perception of immigrant populations, lest the 
U.S. fall into the same pitfalls that the countries of Europe have fallen into when 
dealing with the Romani.  If the U.S. fails to address these issues in a timely fashion, 
it runs the risk of alienating immigrant populations within its borders and creating a 
lesser class of minorities not fully assimilated into mainstream society.  Several 
options are available to address these issues, ranging from federal legislation to 
administrative reform.  
 
 In the current political climate, it seems highly unlikely that any federal 
legislation addressing immigration concerns is likely to pass successfully through 
Congress.  The failure of the DREAM Act201 in December 2010202 highlighted for 
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many just how difficult it will be to pass any immigration legislation in the near 
future.  As a result, the key to reforming criminal immigration programs likely lies 
with the departments and agencies that administer them – DHS and its main 
enforcement arm, ICE.  These organizations must take steps to consolidate 
programming and clarify enforcement goals so that it is clear to observers who will 
be targeted for immigration enforcement and why. 
 
 The first step DHS and ICE should take is to reevaluate and condense some 
of the programs operating under ICE ACCESS.  From the analysis of the 287(g) 
program, CAP, and Secure Communities above, it appears that there are many 
redundancies in the various programs currently administered by ICE.  
Administrators should strive to isolate the strongest aspects of each program and 
consolidate them into one overarching program.  CAP and Secure Communities, 
which already share the same identification and interview processes, could be merged 
with the deputization approach utilized in the 287(g) program so that trained officers 
are physically present at more detention centers across the U.S. to conduct interviews.  
The presence of more federally trained officials on-site should help allay fears of 
local law enforcement using these programs as a cover for racially motivated 
immigration sweeps. 
 
 Second, DHS and ICE should make every effort to build upon the 
memoranda which have been disseminated by John Morton in 2011203 by developing 
and applying clear enforcement priorities that apply to all ICE ACCESS programs.  
These priorities should include clear indications that not all deportees will be 
criminals, so that there is less confusion over enforcement goals and techniques.  By 
being more straightforward regarding how immigration laws will be enforced, 
misconceptions and unrealistic expectations that give rise to criticism may be avoided, 
making it easier for ICE to move forward.  Clarifying enforcement goals will require 
more explicit instruction from both the Executive and Legislative branches.  If the 
goal is to have higher deportation numbers, this needs to be explicitly stated, 
especially as it will likely result in fewer criminal deportations, which are more time 
consuming.204  If, on the other hand, the goal is to remove more criminal aliens, this 
also needs to be explicitly stated, as this will likely result in fewer total removals and 
allegations from political opponents that the federal government is being “soft” on 
immigration.  Either way, clarity is key, and all involved parties should be prepared to 
be more transparent going forward. 
 
 Lastly, all parties with a stake in the reform, from ICE’s leadership to the 
President, should be prepared to encourage public edification on the subject of 
immigration reform.  As long as the public perception of immigration continues to 
be shaped by ever increasing fears of rising crime rates and immigrant criminality, it 
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will be impossible to achieve meaningful immigration reform that brings immigrant 
populations in the U.S. out of the shadows and into mainstream society where they 
can be active and contributing members of our communities. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Since their arrival in Europe centuries ago, the Romani people have endured 
unyielding mistreatment, causing them to largely withdraw from mainstream society.  
Their withdrawal from the community has only cemented the public perception that 
they are undesirable neighbors, criminals, and an economic drain.  This perception 
was highlighted for the world, once again, when France’s Nicolas Sarkozy announced 
in late July 2010 that illegal Romani would be expelled from France and that their 
camps would be dismantled.205  The U.S. is drifting perilously close to following in 
these footsteps as it continues to implement immigration programs in the name of 
national security and public safety but allows them to be executed haphazardly.  
Critics of these programs paint a picture of illegal immigrants living in the U.S. who 
are scared to drive, attend church services, or report crimes to local law enforcement 
because they worry that they will be caught up in the ever increasing web of 
enforcement programs implemented by ICE.206 
 
 While programs that strive to remove the most dangerous criminal aliens 
from society are undoubtedly necessary in today’s world, the departments and 
agencies that administer them need to be very clear about their goals, consider policy 
changes to calm fears of racial profiling and other civil rights violations, and strive to 
educate the public about the realities of immigration in the U.S. today.  Unless steps 
are taken to allay public fears and misconceptions, the U.S. is at risk of enacting 
policies that permanently push minority groups and new waves of immigrants into a 
Romani-like lesser class that will be unable or unwilling to fully integrate into 
mainstream society.  As a nation built on immigration and fueled by diversity,207 the 
U.S. cannot afford to follow this path. 
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